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Abstract 
Economic conditions are typically viewed as having an important influence on 
environmental policy. In particular, it is widely believed that under adverse economic 
conditions, electorates and governments prioritize economic growth and jobs over 
costly ecological restraint. The empirical evidence for this received wisdom, however, 
remains surprisingly contradictory. We contribute to this debate by studying a case 
where the odds of the economy-environment trade-off claim holding true should be 
high: an emerging economy in severe recession, and environmental policy with high 
short-term costs and long-term benefits. Based on a representative survey (N=2449) 
in Brazil, implemented in late 2015/early 2016, we examine how ego- and socio-
tropic economic conditions, both perceived and real, affect citizens’ preferences 
concerning the mitigation of deforestation and climate change. We find no robust 
evidence for an economy-environment trade-off. The main policy implication is that, 
from a public opinion perspective, there is considerable room for ambitious 
environmental policy even under adverse economic conditions.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Economic conditions are widely regarded as having an important effect on 
environmental policy-making. Specifically, economic downturns are widely presumed 
to undermine environmental policy, in the sense of making it harder for policy-makers 
to increase the ambition level of existing policies or put new policies into place, or in 
the sense of backsliding on policies already in existence. Economic recessions lead to 
increased unemployment and also to more economic insecurity (labour market risks) 
among the employed part of the population. Under such conditions, most people are 
likely to prioritize economic recovery (through economic growth) as well as social 
welfare spending for the needy (to reduce labour market risks) over costly 
environmental policy. Government thus faces strong pressure from citizens to avoid 
opportunity costs resulting from environmental policy and instead enact policies that 
stimulate economic growth and job creation, and provide enhanced social safety nets 
(e.g., Kachi et al., 2015; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012). 
 
Critics of this argument point to two counter-arguments. One is that environmental 
quality (e.g., air and water quality) has become an increasingly important element in 
people’s general quality of life. Even in times of economic recession, citizens and 
their governments are thus likely to value environmental quality in its own right. 
Another argument is that the opportunity costs of environmental policies are often 
overstated. In contrast, the literature on ecosystems services and co-benefits of 
environmental policy posits that such policies have net benefits for society. To the 
extent these arguments hold true, we should not expect economic downturns to 
undermine environmental policy (e.g., McCright and Dunlap, 2011; Mildenberger and 
Leiserowitz, 2017). 
 
The empirical evidence for these claims is, thus far, contradictory and relies on rather 
few studies focusing on different levels of analysis, different (often single) countries, 
and different points in time (e.g., Kachi et al., 2015; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, 
2017; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012). Our study contributes to this literature by 
empirically testing the economy-environment trade-off argument in a case where the 
odds of finding support for this claim should be rather high. To this end, we pose the 
question, how does economic recession impact on environmental policy? To examine 
such question, we focus on an emerging economy facing a severe recession, and an 
environmental policy-area involving high opportunity costs, i.e., deforestation in 
Brazil (see also Viola and Franchini, 2017). The motivation for this approach is that 
failure to find supporting empirical evidence for an economy-environment trade-off in 
this case would clearly undermine the argument and thus speak in favour of the 
counter-arguments raised by sceptics of the economy-environment trade-off 
hypothesis. 
 
The policy-relevance of studying the economy-environment trade-off derives from the 
problem of self-fulfilling prophecies. To the extent policy-makers believe that there is 
a strong economy-environment trade-off from the viewpoint of the electorate they are 
likely to lower their ambition level in environmental policy-making and 
implementation. In the same vein, they will tend to side with non-green interests when 
exposed to political pressure from interest groups advocating stronger (e.g., 
environmental NGOs) or weaker (e.g., energy intensive economic sectors) 
environmental standards respectively. Failure in trying to find empirical support for 
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this claim, in turn, would imply that policy-makers have, at least from a public 
opinion perspective, more room for pursuing ambitious environmental policies in 
economically difficult times than conventional wisdom suggests.  
 
 
2. The Economy-Environment Trade-off 
 
Existing empirical research on the economy-environment trade-off has focused 
primarily on variation in public support for environmental policy as the outcome to be 
explained, and less on variation in government regulatory activity. The reason is that 
we should expect the environmental “public mood” to be more sensitive to changes in 
economic conditions than the policy-making apparatus of government. This means 
that, when economic growth slows down, we are likely to empirically pick up the 
negative effects on environmental policy faster if we look at public opinion compared 
to formal output from policy-making processes (Anderson et al., 2017). Moreover, 
public opinion is obviously important for policy-making, particularly in democracies 
where policy-makers face elections at regular intervals (Tjernström and Tietenberg, 
2008). This does not mean that policy-makers will always do what the majority of 
citizens prefer. However, if we assume that business actors, by-and-large, usually do 
not prefer stricter environmental standards, government could be less likely to enact 
new environmental policies if the public does not support such policies. That is, 
public support is probably not a sufficient condition for stricter environmental 
standards, but probably a necessary condition (Anderson et al., 2017). 
 
Empirical work along these lines has produced somewhat contradictory evidence 
(Council on Foreign Relations, 2013; Diemann and Franzen, 1999; Gells, 2013; Kachi 
et al., 2015; Kahn and Kotchen, 2011; Mayer and Smith, 2016; Mildenberger and 
Leiserowitz, 2017; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012; Shum, 2012). For instance, Kahn and 
Kotchen (2011), in an analysis of the United States, find that “an increase in a state’s 
unemployment rate decreases Google searches for “global warming” and increases 
searches for “unemployment ... (and that an) increase in a state’s unemployment rate 
is associated with a decrease in the probability that residents think global warming is 
happening and reduced support for the U.S. to target policies intended to mitigate 
climate change” (p.257). Scruggs and Benegal (2012) conclude that “the decline in 
belief about climate change is most likely driven by the economic insecurity caused 
by the Great Recession…The implication of these findings is that the ‘‘crisis of 
confidence’’ in climate change will likely rebound after labor market conditions 
improve, but not until then” (p.505). In contrast, Kachi et al. (2015), focusing on the 
United States and Germany, find that “individuals' perceptions of their own economic 
situations have no significant effect on their policy support. Negative perceptions of 
the national economic outlook reduce support for climate policy in the US, but not in 
Germany” (p.227). Mildenberger and Leiserowitz (2017), focusing on the United 
States and using panel data for climate attitudes (survey data for the same individuals 
at two points in time, 2008, 2011), find that there is “little evidence that changes in 
either individual economic fortunes or local economic conditions are associated with 
decreased belief that climate change is happening or reduced prioritization of climate 
policy action. Instead, the evidence suggests that climate belief declines are associated 
with shifting political cues” (p.801). 
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One limitation of these studies is that they focus on high-income countries. To 
provide a hard test of the economy-environment trade-off claim amongst the mass 
public it is worthwhile to examine a worst-case setting. The logic for doing so is that 
if we cannot find a trade-off in such a setting, we are unlikely to find it in more 
benign settings. This is why, empirically, we focus on Brazil, an emerging economy 
that is facing a severe economic recession, and on a costly environmental policy issue.  
 
According to the environmental Kuznets curve argument, developing countries or 
emerging economies are more likely to prioritize economic growth over 
environmental protection (Chandler et al., 2002; Dasgupta et al., 2002; Davidson et al., 
2012; Solomon and Johnson, 2009; Stern, 2007; Tol, 2009; Tschakert, 2007). 
Combining this condition with an economic recession we should expect the mass 
public (as well as policy-makers) to prioritize economic growth and jobs over 
environmental protection even more strongly. This should be particularly the case 
with respect to environmental policies (mitigating deforestation and climate change is 
the focus here) that are associated with high short-term opportunity costs and longer-
term benefits.  
 
In this study we focus on Brazil, a key country in global climate, biodiversity, and 
forest policy (e.g., Aklin et al., 2013; Held et al., 2013; Viola, 2013). The importance 
of climate policy stems from the fact that tropical forests constitute an enormous 
carbon sink. Brazil and Indonesia, which account for around 35% of total carbon 
stored in tropical forests globally, are responsible for the largest emissions from 
tropical deforestation (Baccini et al., 2012). In 2005, deforestation accounted for as 
much as 60% of Brazil’s total GHGs while a further 20% resulted from its agriculture 
(Dayrell and Urry, 2015; Gebara et al., 2014; Hargrave and Kis-Katos, 2013; Held et 
al., 2013; Lapola et al., 2014; Strassburg et al., 2014; Vincent et al., 2014). 
 
At the same time, Brazil has been facing a severe economic recession. Figure 1 shows 
a comparison between individual-level perceptions of the economy and the real 
economic situation in Brazil between 1995 and 2015. The data for perceptions is from 
the Latinobarometro and the economic growth rates data is from the World Bank. 
Economic growth in Brazil has worsened since 1995 and people have become more 
concerned about the economic situation and unemployment. Taken together, the three 
aforementioned conditions (emerging economy, recession, deforestation policy) 
should make the economy-environment trade-off very salient among the mass public 
and result in relatively high odds of finding a negative effect of economic conditions 
on climate policy support. 
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Figure 1: Real and perceived economic conditions in Brazil 
 
Notes: The black-dashed line shows the sum of “bad” and “very bad” responses to the survey 
item: "In general, how would you describe the present economic situation of the country? 
Would you say that it is ...?." The black-dotted line shows the sum of “concerned” and “very 
concerned” responses to the survey item: “How concerned would you say you are that you 
will be left without work within the next 12 months?”  
 
 
 
3. Empirical Study Design 
 
If the economy-environment trade-off argument holds true our findings should be as 
follows. People who are worse off economically and hold more pessimistic views 
about their household’s and their country’s economic prospects are less likely to be 
concerned about environmental problems. Additionally, they are less supportive of 
and less willing to pay for environmental policy (in our case policies to mitigate 
climate change and deforestation).  
 
To examine these hypotheses, we developed a dedicated survey instrument, and 
fielded the survey in Brazil from December 28, 2015, to January 12, 2016 (N=2,449). 
The survey was designed and pre-tested by the authors and was implemented by 
YouGov and its local partner in Brazil, Netquest (see also Table A.1 in the appendix). 
Around 3,000 Brazilian residents were recruited and interviewed online via 
Netquest’s online platform. Survey participants were paid in pontos caracol (points 
that are exchanged in cash). Based on propensity score matching, they were then 
fitted to a sample of 2,500 to produce the final dataset. The sample is weighed 
according to age, gender, and education. The survey included, in random order, items 
capturing attitudes towards climate change, deforestation and policy preferences in 
-
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this regard, items on personal and national economic conditions, and various other 
items that serve as control variables. Our general approach was to capture climate and 
deforestation attitudes/preferences as well as economic conditions from a variety of 
angles and thus minimize measurement error and obtain robust findings.  
 
Deforestation and climate change issues in Brazil are closely related, though of course 
not identical. This is why our outcome measures cover both. The outcomes to be 
explained are constructed from multiple survey items that capture: (a) climate risk 
perceptions, (b) support for climate change and deforestation mitigation, and (c) 
willingness to pay (WTP) for forest conservation in Brazil. The focus on three distinct 
constructs, which capture a broader set of environmental attitudes and preferences, 
derives from the notion that concern or risk perception is widely regarded as a 
prerequisite for policy support (Leiserowitz, 2006; Weber, 2010). However, concern 
is arguably a necessary but not sufficient condition for supporting costly policy to 
reduce the risk. This is why the second variable captures policy support (Harring and 
Jagers 2013; McCright, 2010; Tjernström and Tietenberg, 2008). Moreover, various 
studies show that people will often support risk reduction policies, but that costly 
policies are less attractive. This is why we add a willingness to pay variable (Aldy et 
al., 2012; Bakaki and Bernauer, 2016; Bechtel and Scheve, 2015; Diederich and 
Goeschl, 2014; Gampfer et al., 2014; Jacobsen and Hanley, 2009; Inglehart, 1995; 
Krosnick and MacInnis, 2013; Tobler et al., 2012; Vincent et al., 2014). Most of the 
existing literature relies on one or two single survey items for capturing the outcome 
variable. Mildenberger and Leiserowitz (2017) in fact note that “Future research 
could benefit from richer and more sophisticated measures of public opinion and 
concern, including measures that deliberately emphasize cost implications of different 
policy options, mirroring the cost sensitive frames that have become popular in the 
climate framing literature. Future panels should also collect subjective perceptual data 
on economic conditions across all waves” (p.18). Our study design improves on the 
existing literature along these lines. Table A.2 in the appendix shows the survey items 
used to construct the three dependent variables in the analysis. 
 
To start with the dependent variable of climate risk perceptions, we measured 
people’s perception of climate change harm at the individual and societal level (Kachi 
et al., 2015; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012). Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) for the 
two items included in our study shows high uniqueness (0.8413). This means that we 
cannot create a CFA composite measure, but instead we aggregated the two items by 
adding their scores. The risk perception variable thus ranges from 2 to 10 (from low 
risk perception to high risk perception; see also Table A.3).  
 
For the climate policy support variable, we asked participants whether they support 
climate change mitigation in general and deforestation policy more specifically. We 
constructed a composite measure based on polychoric correlation matrix analysis (see 
Tables A.4 and A.5), which resulted in a continuous variable scaled from 0 to 1. 
Polychoric correlation matrix analysis estimates the correlation between two (or more) 
theorised continuous latent variables (in this case support for climate change policy), 
from two (or more) observed ordinal variables (in this case 5 survey items pertaining 
to people’s support for climate change mitigation). It also facilitates the construction 
of composite measures from items with different scaling. Particularly, it reduces the 
effect of statistical artifacts (e.g., the number of response scales) leading to items 
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grouping together in factors. Ultimately, it therefore allows testing the hypothesis that 
a relationship between observed items and their underlying latent constructs exists (as 
it is in our study). 
 
The third outcome variable employed in our analysis refers to WTP for deforestation 
policy in Brazil. The existing literature has employed two approaches for examining 
WTP. The first gauges WTP in a rather broad sense, assuming that people who are 
concerned about environmental risks will eventually be willing to pay for their 
mitigation (e.g., Krosnick and MacInnis, 2013). The second approach results in 
monetized measurement units by providing cost implications of climate change 
mitigation (e.g., Kotchen et al., 2013). In our study, we pursue the broader approach 
and thus asked survey participants whether they are willing to financially contribute 
to mitigating deforestation and climate change in Brazil, either via taxes or by 
contributing to environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs).We 
constructed a composite variable based on polychoric correlation matrix analysis (see 
Tables A.6 and A.7), which resulted is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. 
 
Moving to the independent variables in the analysis, the existing literature does not 
offer elaborate theoretical arguments on the expected effects of different expressions 
of the “economic conditions” concept on environmental attitudes and policy 
preferences (e.g., Mayer and Smith, 2016). Besides differences in dependent variables 
as well as samples (different countries at different points in time), this may be one of 
the reasons for the mixed findings on the economy-environment trade-off. Arguably 
the most straightforward distinction relates to scale and time. Regarding scale, one 
reference frame for economic conditions pertains to the personal or household 
economic condition (ego-tropic frame), the other to larger-scale conditions, such as 
those of the country or region of residence (socio-tropic frame). Regarding time, 
economic conditions can be conceptualized as backward looking (e.g., the past few 
years), the present, or the future (e.g., the coming few years). Moreover, measures of 
current and past economic conditions, both ego- and socio-tropic, can be “objective” 
(e.g., survey respondents’ stated current or past income, a country’s current or past 
economic growth or unemployment rate). Which of these various ways of capturing 
economic conditions matters more is ultimately an empirical question.  
 
We use three survey items to capture economic conditions. They cover both the ego-
tropic and socio-tropic level. That is, we asked participants to assess the prospects of 
the national economy and also their household economic situation. Additionally, we 
asked for their current economic situation (refer to Table A.8 in the appendix for 
details on these items). Previous studies (e.g., Mayer and Smith, 2016) focus on 
current and retrospective economic conditions. We place greater emphasis on forward 
looking (subjective) economic measures because citizens, when asked to express their 
attitudes and preferences towards (prospective) environmental conditions and policies 
are more likely to relate them to what they expect their own and their country’s 
economic condition to be in the future. We return to this issue in the concluding 
section. 
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4. Results 
 
Before proceeding with the empirical analysis, we provide a series of descriptive 
statistics for the dependent and independent variables in the study. Table 1 shows the 
correlation matrix and the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of these three variables, 
each of which was constructed from several survey items (see Tables A.3, A.5 and 
A.7 in the appendix). The pairwise correlation of these three variables is rather low, 
with the highest correlation coefficient r=0.26. The VIFs also indicate that the three 
items are not strongly correlated or overlapping, since all VIFs scores are below the 
common threshold value of 5 (O’Brien, 2007).  
 
Table 1: Correlations and VIFs for the dependent (outcome) variables  
 Risk perception Support WTP VIF 
Risk perception 1.00   1.09 
Support 0.26 1.00  1.10 
WTP 0.17 0.17 1.00 1.05 
Note: Significant at 1%. 
 
Table 2 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients and the VIFs for the main 
explanatory variables. Neither are the correlation coefficients particularly large, nor 
do the VIFs point to a multicollinearity problem. 
 
Table 2: Correlations and VIFs for the independent variables  
 Household 
prospects 
National 
prospects 
Current 
income 
VIF 
Household prospects 1.00   1.14 
National prospects -0.35 1.00  1.15 
Current income -0.04  0.07 1.00 1.01 
Note: Significant at 1%. 
 
Kachi et al. (2015) and Mildenberger and Leiserowitz (2017) use geo-coded 
economic data to capture current economic conditions. They do not find significant 
effects of these variables on environmental attitudes and preferences. However, we 
add regional dummy variables, which are likely to capture differing economic 
conditions as well.  
 
The regression models presented below on also include various control variables that 
have appeared as significant determinants of environmental risk perceptions and 
policy preferences in prior research (e.g., Aldy et al., 2012; Bakaki and Bernauer, 
2016; Brulle et al., 2012; Carmichael and Brulle, 2017; Drews and Bergh, 2015; 
Fairbrother, 2016; Gampfer et al., 2014; Geels, 2013; Kachi et al., 2015; Kahn and 
Kochen, 2011; Lam, 2014; Low and Chow, 2015; Mayer and Smith, 2016; McCright 
and Dunlap, 2011; Pisano and Lubell, 2015; Scruggs and Benegal, 2012). Table 3 
shows these variables, together with their summary statistics. Item wordings are 
shown in Table A.9. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics for independent (explanatory) variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Household prospects 2449 2.99 1.13 1 5 
National prospects 2449 2.34 1.17 1 5 
Current income 2449 2.81 2.82 1 16 
Left 2449 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Center 2449 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Right 2449 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Age 2449 34.89 11.93 18 78 
Gender 2449 1.50 0.50 1 2 
Education 2449 3.45 1.05 1 6 
Salience of deforest. 2449 2.85 0.49 0 3 
Unemployment 2449 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Trust 2449 0.68 0.64 0 2 
Knowledge 2449 0.50 0.50 0 1 
North 2449 0.16 0.36 0 1 
North East 2449 0.17 0.38 0 1 
South 2449 0.17 0.37 0 1 
South East 2449 0.40 0.49 0 1 
 
A descriptive look at the key variables in our analysis shows that both personal and 
national economic conditions in Brazil are regarded as critical, which is in line with 
the data shown in Figure 1. More than 32% believe that their household income in the 
next three years will decrease somewhat or a lot. More than 62% think that the 
national economic situation will become somewhat worse or a lot worse in the next 
three years. However, climate change risks are regarded as very high and support for 
policies against deforestation and climate change is strong. Most study participants 
regard climate change as an important risk (mean=9.07 on a 2-10 scale, st.dev=1.02). 
Support for mitigating deforestation and climate change is also high (mean=0.82 on a 
0-1 scale), whereas willingness to pay is, as one would expect, substantially lower but 
still quite high (mean=0.44 on a 0-1 scale).  
 
Table 4 shows the main regression analysis results. Please refer to the appendix table 
A.10 for more information on the OLS assumptions. Due to the large number of 
categories of the ordinal variable (risk perceptions), we employ an ordinary least 
square (OLS) model (Long, 1997) (see also Model 1 in Table A.11 of the appendix 
for results from an ordered logit model). Model 1 focuses on climate risk perceptions. 
It indicates that for a unit increase in individuals’ household income prospects climate 
risk perception decreases by 0.05 units. The perceived prospects of the national 
economy and current income have no significant effect. Older and more educated 
individuals as well as those who believe that deforestation is a salient issue perceive 
higher climate change risks. More educated individuals have a broader understanding 
of environmental issues and link deforestation with climate change. Generally, these 
results are in line with previous studies that do not find a substantive economy-
environment trade-off (Kachi et al., 2015; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz, 2017) (see 
also Table A.11 for regression results for the survey items in disaggregated format). 
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In other words, these prior results uphold even in a poorer country in the midst of a 
severe economic recession. 
 
With regards to Model 2, perceived prospects of the national economy are not 
significantly related to support for climate change mitigation. We find though that 
individuals who believe that their household income will improve show significantly 
stronger support for climate change policy. That is, better household income prospects 
do increase support for climate change policy. Current income also has a significant, 
positive effect on support for climate change mitigation. Wealthier individuals 
(measured by the current household status) are more supportive of climate policy (see 
also Franzen and Vogl 2013b). As to the political ideology indicators, we find 
significant results for “central” political ideology; individuals subscribing to this 
ideology show lower support for climate change mitigation (“uncertain” is the 
baseline category) (see also Harring et al., 2017; Hu et al., 2017; Cruz, 2017; Curie 
and Choma, 2018; Varela-Candamio et al., 2018). Older people are more supportive 
of climate change policy (Bakaki and Bernauer 2017; Goerres 2008). Educated, 
employed and more knowledgeable study participants also exhibit higher levels of 
support for climate change policy. People who trust the government more exhibit less 
support for climate policy. We also find some regional effects: people from the North, 
South and South East of Brazil show higher levels of climate policy support. For 
regression models examining each survey item of the “support” variable individually, 
see Table A.12. 
 
Model 3 in Table 4 shows the results for the relationship between willingness to pay 
for forest conservation and economic indicators. We find that individuals’ perceived 
economic prospects of their household have a significant, positive effect on WTP. 
People who are more optimistic about their future household income are more willing 
to pay for forest conservation. The perceived prospects of the national economy and 
current income have no significant effect on the WTP for forest conservation. Left 
ideology increases WTP while older individuals are less willing to pay. Also, the 
results show that women are in general more willing to pay for forest conservation 
than men, and that people with higher trust in government exhibit higher levels of 
WTP (e.g. Fairbrother 2016). Results for the survey items in disaggregated form are 
shown in Table A.13. 
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Table 4: Regression results 
 (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) 
 Risk perception Climate Pol. support WTP 
Household prospects -0.05*** 0.01* 0.01** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
National prospects -0.03 -0.00 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
Current income 0.00 0.01* 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Left 0.17*** 0.01 0.04*** 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) 
Center -0.05 -0.02** 0.01 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
Right 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age 0.01*** 0.01*** -0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender 0.03 -0.01 0.03** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Education 0.07*** 0.01*** 0.01 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
Salience of deforest. 0.46*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
Unemployment 0.04 0.02** -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) 
Trust 0.04 -0.01*** 0.07*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Knowledge 0.02 0.03*** 0.01 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) 
North 0.04 0.02* -0.01 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) 
North East 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) 
South 0.05 0.03** -0.04 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) 
South East 0.02 0.03*** -0.02 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 7.35*** (0.19) 
0.48*** 
(0.03) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
N 2449 2449 2449 
adj. R2 0.07 0.09 0.06 
F 11.42 15.73 9.93 
Notes: Estimates are based on ordinary least squares regression (OLS). Standard errors are in 
parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
We acknowledge that, like in most other statistical models based on survey data, the adj. R2 
values are rather small. However, since we are interested in the effects of specific variables and 
not in explaining as much of the total variance in the outcome variables as possible, this is of 
little concern here.  
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To obtain more information on the (relative) effects of different indicators for 
economic conditions on our three outcome variables, we calculated marginal effects, 
holding all other independent variables constant. Figure 2 depicts the results based on 
Models 1, 2 and 3 (Table 4). Point estimates and confidence intervals are based on 
actual values, while entries in Table 4 are rounded to two digits after point decimals.  
Marginal effects indicate change in the unit of the dependent variable when increasing 
the respective explanatory variable by one unit, while holding all other variables 
constant. Amongst the three explanatory variables of interest here, only one has a 
significant effect: perceived economic household prospects have a significantly 
negative effect on climate risk perceptions. That is, individuals who expect their 
household to be wealthier in the near future are less worried about climate change. At 
the same time, they are slightly more supportive of climate change policy and 
mitigating deforestation and more willing to pay for forest conservation (see also 
Franzen and Vogl, 2013b). Household wealth thus appears to make people more 
optimistic with respect to climate risks and somewhat more supportive of measures to 
mitigate climate change and deforestation. This result is orthogonal to the 
environment-economy trade-off claim. One interpretation of this finding is that richer 
individuals may expect to be able to better avoid or adapt to increased environmental 
risks, but still exhibit stronger socio-tropic environmental policy preferences. Overall, 
we find only very weak evidence in favour of the economy-environment trade-off 
argument. In fact, economic conditions matter (in terms of statistical significance) in 
one out of nine empirical models and the hypothesis that prospects of economy 
impact on people’s risk perceptions about climate change.  
 
Figure 2: Marginal effects of the economic indicators 
 
Notes: Horizontal bars denote 95% confidence intervals. The dashed vertical line marks a 
marginal effect of 0.  
 
Household prospects
Household prospects
Household prospects
National prospects
National prospects
National prospects
Current income
Current income
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Figures 3-5 show predicted values for all three dependent variables when employing a 
three-way interaction with the three main explanatory variables: household prospects, 
national prospects, and current income. Predicted values pertain to those estimations 
from the model in light of the covariate information we feed into this. The rationale 
behind this approach is to examine whether anticipated economic conditions, i.e., 
household and national prospects, condition the impact of current income. Since it is 
difficult to directly interpret the signs or significance levels of such three-way 
interactions (Brambor et al., 2006; Dawson and Richter, 2004), we calculated and 
present predicted values for the respective outcome variable given certain scenarios 
pertaining to values of the three main explanatory variables. 
 
Figure 3 focuses on climate change risk perceptions. This graph plots how much 
individuals’ climate risk perceptions change across levels of current income (from the 
minimum to the maximum) for the extreme scenarios of household and national 
prospects of the economy (from the minimum to the maximum). Three interesting 
findings emerge from this analysis. First, at low levels of current income, the 
predicted values converge to the same, relatively high value of risk perceptions. This 
means that there is no conditional effect among the three economic indicators at low 
levels of current income. Second, there is, nonetheless, strong evidence for a 
conditioning effect at high levels of current income. Consider the maximum value of 
current income in Figure 3: for the scenario of very good (maximum) household and 
national economic prospects, the predicted value of climate risk perception is at the 
lowest value (around 8.0). Conversely, when worsening either household prospects or 
national prospects (or both), the predicted value of climate risk perceptions becomes 
higher. Third, and deriving from the last point, although the lowest value of risk 
perception obtains for a “good economic scenario,” i.e., all three economic variables 
are linked to the best economic conditions, the scenario involving low household and 
low national prospects is not the worst among the high-income cases (see the 
maximum value of current income towards the right of Figure 3). In fact, the highest 
value for climate risk perceptions results for a high current-income situation, a good 
national prospect, but low expectations about the household situation (household 
prospect = minimum).  
 
Figure 4 shows how much climate policy support changes across current income 
(from the minimum to the maximum) for the extreme scenarios of household and 
national economic prospects (from the minimum to the maximum). The results look 
similar to Figure 3. That is, climate change risk perceptions and policy support are 
affected by the economic variables in similar ways.  
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Figure 3: Predicted climate change risk perceptions, contingent on perceived 
economic prospects 
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Figure 4: Predicted climate policy support, contingent on perceived economic prospects 
 
Finally, the results displayed in Figure 5 do not suggest a clearly identifiable or 
consistent pattern. However, some effects shown in this figure are consistent with 
previously observed patterns or general expectations. Individuals with lower incomes 
exhibit a lower willingness to pay. This is evident from the higher predicted WTP 
scores on the right-hand side of the figure. Higher income persons, however, express 
a lower willingness to pay when holding worse expectations about household and 
national economy prospects. If any (or both) type of economic prospect(s) improves, 
so does the WTP for higher current-income individuals. This pattern is also consistent 
with lowering either household prospects or national prospects (or both) in low 
current-income situations: the predicted value of WTP decreases with lower national 
and/or household economic prospects in the low-current income scenario (left-hand 
side of Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Predicted WTP, contingent on perceived economic prospects 
 
 
5. Concluding comments 
 
The purpose of this study was to examine the economy-environment trade-off 
argument in a setting that should be conducive to finding empirical support for this 
claim. This setting is characterized by an emerging economy context, a severe 
economic recession, and an environmental policy area (climate change, deforestation) 
that is associated with rather high short-term opportunity costs and long-term benefits. 
This setting should induce individuals to discount future benefits and focus on present 
costs. These conditions are likely to make the economy-environment trade-off 
publicly salient and should, as a result, make those citizens who are economically 
worse off and more pessimistic about their own and their country’s economic 
prospects less worried about environmental risks and less willing to support and pay 
for policies addressing those risks. 
 
Because economic recessions have different impacts on individuals within any given 
country it is important to study the implications of economic conditions at that level 
of analysis, rather than by merely correlating macro-level economic performance data 
with average national environmental risk perceptions and environmental policy 
support among the mass public over time. That is, ideally, we need evidence both for 
the macro level and the micro level. The studies by Mildenberger and Leiserowitz 
(2017) and Kachi et al. (2015) do so, whereas the Kahn and Kotchen (2011) and 
Scuggs and Benegal (2012) studies rely on aggregated/pooled public opinion data in 
comparing US states as well as the United States and some European countries. Such 
research could be based on panel survey data for many countries over a long time-
period or at least for particular countries over several years. Such data is not available 
for Brazil, except one series of surveys undertaken by the Brazilian ministry of the 
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environment covering a few selected years in the 1992-2012 period and ending well 
before the current economic recession started (Ministério do Meio Ambiente, 2012). 
Evidently, however, survey data capturing economic conditions (perceived and stated) 
and environmental attitudes and preferences cannot be collected for past years. This 
means that, for almost all countries globally, we are limited to testing the economy-
environment trade-off hypothesis with time-invariant data, which involves comparing 
individuals at a given point in time. In our case, however, this limitation may not be a 
significant problem. To the extent we cannot identify a robust correlation between 
economic conditions and environmental attitudes/preferences; a causal effect is 
unlikely to exist.  
 
Yet another limitation is that our sample is quite representative on standard socio-
demographic variables, but deviates to some extent from samples in other surveys in 
terms of political ideology. Moreover, the economic and political situation in Brazil 
has been in flux since we carried out our survey. It would thus certainly be useful to 
replicate our survey in Brazil to find out whether our results uphold when using more 
recent survey information, and perhaps also based on a sample that mimics political 
and economic population characteristics even more closely than our sample did for 
late 2015/early 2016. 
 
Despite these limitations, we believe that our approach can provide valuable evidence 
concerning the empirical validity of the economy-environment trade-off claim. In 
particular, if we “stack the deck” in favour of the hypothesis and still are not able to 
find robust evidence in support, this suggests that the hypothesis is unlikely to uphold 
in more benign economic settings. This is what our empirical findings show. 
Specifically, people who are more pessimistic about national economic prospects are, 
however, not less (or more) supportive of costly environmental policy, relative to 
people who are more optimistic about national economic conditions. Better economic 
household prospects are associated with lower perceived environmental risks and 
stronger environmental policy support and WTP, but these effects are mostly 
substantively small and statistically not significant. It is worth noting that our 
approach, although it is based on data collected at one point in time, deals with 
changes over time at least indirectly, in that it captures people’s current economic 
condition, as it has evolved over time (income, employment status), as well as future 
(expected) economic conditions (personal, national). The dependent variable, in turn, 
measures attitudes and preferences pertaining to current as well as possible future 
environmental problems and policies. 
 
By-and-large, our results line up well with those two of the studies referred to at the 
outset that are also based on individual level data (Kachi et al., 2015; Mildenberger 
and Leiserowitz, 2017). They bolster these findings primarily by showing that there is 
only very weak evidence for an economy-environment trade-off also under generally 
much worse economic conditions (Brazil, as compared to Germany and the United 
States, for instance).   
 
The main policy implication of our results is that, from a public opinion perspective, 
there is considerable room for ambitious environmental policy even under difficult 
economic conditions. The fact that economic conditions do not relate to people’s 
preferences about climate policy leaves space to decision makers and practitioners to 
move forward with environmental policy.  This finding also means that policy-makers 
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can, without significant risk of being punished by voters, avoid a self-fulfilling 
prophecy when confronted with strong rhetoric by non-green interests about an 
economy-environment trade-off. It also means, however, that when economic growth 
picks up again after a recession this may not automatically lead to stronger pro-
environmental attitudes and policy preferences to the extent public environmental 
attitudes and preferences are weak for reasons other than economic conditions. 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Around 3,000 Brazilian residents were recruited and interviewed online. Based on 
propensity score matching, they were then fitted to a sample of 2,500 to produce the 
final dataset. YouGov, the survey firm through which we organized the survey, then 
raked to marginals (i.e., carried out a sample balancing) for gender, age, and 
education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2014 
Americas Barometer from the LAPOP project at Vanderbilt University with selection 
within strata by weighted sampling with replacement. The matched cases were 
weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the 
frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the 
frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, region, years of education, 
and frequency of internet usage. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of 
the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these 
deciles. The final weights were post-stratified to match the distribution of the 
sampling frame on three-category age, gender, and three-category education 
indicators. We acknowledge the potential biases this sampling approach engenders 
(particularly in view of incomplete internet penetration in Brazil). However, it is 
widely acknowledged in current survey research that this approach provides samples 
and survey data of at least equivalent quality as traditional telephone or mail based 
recruitment into paper-and-pencil, telephone, or online-surveys, with response rates 
that hardly ever get beyond 5-10 percent. Table A.1 compares the socio-demographics 
of our sample to census and survey data from 2013/14.   
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Table A.1: Comparison of Socio-Demographic Characteristics of Sample and 
Population  
 Our sample Population Source of 
population data 
Political 
Ideology 
Left: 14.01% 
Center-left: 7.56% 
Center: 11.52% 
Center right: 5.32% 
Right: 8.76% 
Uncertain: 52.82% 
Left: 16.94% 
Center-left: 12.29% 
Center: 24.92% 
Center right: 13.12% 
Right: 17.86% 
Uncertain: 14.87% 
Latinobarometer 
2016 
Education The median value of age when 
respondents completed 
education is 19 (48% of 
participants completed 
education at between 17-19 
years of age). 
The median value of age 
when respondents 
completed education is 17 
Latinobarometer 
2016 
Income The average income is 
R$ 10,000.00 - R$ 20,000.00 
The 2016 Brazilian 
average household income 
was R$ 29,542.17 
The World Bank 
 2016 
Gender 
(male: 
female 
ratio) 
1:1 0.98:1 (2011 est.) The World 
Factbook (CIA) 
Age The median age is 34  
 
The median age is 31 
(2011 est.) 
 
The World 
Factbook (CIA) 
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Table A.2: Survey items for the three dependent variables (translation from Portuguese) 
 
Climate risk perception 
1. Do you think climate change is harming people in Brazil 
now, will harm people in Brazil in the next few years, will not 
harm people in Brazil for many years, or will never harm people 
in Brazil? 
 
 
 2. How concerned are you, if at all, that climate change will 
harm you personally at some point in your lifetime? 
 
 
 
 
 
Support for mitigating deforestation and climate change 
1. We need to preserve rainforests in Brazil even if this means 
less land for agriculture or construction in Brazil. 
 
 
 2. We need to preserve rainforests in Brazil, even if this means 
that the government of Brazil has to reduce government 
spending/investment in other areas. 
 
 
 
3. The government of Brazil has pledged to reduce the country's 
emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), which contribute to climate 
change (global warming), by a large amount (around 40 
percent). These reductions would take place over the next five 
to ten years. To that end, the government plans to conserve 
forests and reduce deforestation in Brazil and increase the 
amount of electricity from hydropower, solar, and wind.  To 
what extent do you personally support or oppose this policy? 
 
4. People hold different views on whether Brazil should 
increase its forest conservation efforts on its own, or do so only 
if richer (industrialized) countries provide financial assistance to 
Brazil for this purpose. Which of the following statements 
comes closest to your own personal point of view? Brazil 
should increase its forest conservation efforts . . . 
 
 
5. People hold different views on whether Brazil should reduce 
its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions on its own, or reduce its 
emissions only if other countries do the same and provide 
 
 
1 Climate change does not exist 
2 Never 
3 Not in many years 
4 In the next few years 
5 Now 
 
1 Climate change does not exist 
2 Not at all concerned 
3 Not too concerned 
4 Somewhat concerned 
5 Very concerned 
 
 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
 
1 Strongly support 
2 Support 
3 Oppose 
4 Strongly oppose 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Regardless of whether richer countries
provide financial assistance to Brazil 
2 Only if industrialized countries (e.g. 
United States, Germany, Japan) provide 
financial assistance to Brazil 
3 Brazil should not increase its forest 
conservation efforts 
 
1 Regardless of what other countries 
do 
2 Only if industrialized countries (e.g. 
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financial assistance to Brazil for this purpose. Which of the 
following statements comes closest to your own personal point 
of view? Brazil should reduce its carbon dioxide emissions . . . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Willingness to pay for forest conservation 
1. We need to preserve rainforests in Brazil, even if this 
means raising taxes in Brazil to fund forest conservation. 
 
 
 
2. Would you personally be willing or not be willing to pay an 
additional R$ 30 in taxes per month over the next few years to 
enable Brazil to invest more in forest conservation? 
 
3. Would you personally be willing or not be willing to 
contribute R$ 100 to a large private environmental organization 
to support forest conservation in Brazil such as the Instituto de 
Pesquisas Ecológicas (IPÊ; this is an institute for environmental 
education and research that deals with deforestation issues in 
Brazil; more information is available at: www.ipe.org.br)? 
 
4. Would you personally be willing or not be willing to pay 
more for certain products related to forests, such as furniture or 
food, if this helped to protect forests in Brazil? 
 
 
5. We now ask you to participate in a lottery. Once this survey 
is completed 50 participants will be randomly selected to 
receive a prize of 90 pontos caracol (78BRL) each. You will be 
notified by e-mail if you are among the winners. At this point 
please select one of two types of prizes you would like to 
receive if you are among the winners: 
 
United States, Germany, Japan) reduce 
their own emissions as well 
3 Only if industrialized countries 
reduce their own emissions as well and 
provide international funding and 
technical support to Brazil for this 
purpose 
4 Only if other lower income countries 
(e.g. China and India) reduce their own 
emissions as well 
5 Brazil should not reduce its carbon 
dioxide emissions. 
 
 
 
1 Strongly agree 
2 Agree 
3 Disagree 
4 Strongly disagree 
 
 
1 Would be willing 
2 Would not be willing 
 
 
1 Would be willing 
2 Would not be willing 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Would be willing 
2 Would not be willing 
 
 
 
1 A points prize of 90 pontos caracol 
(If you choose this option and win, 90 
pontos caracol will be added as bonus 
to your account). 
2 A donation to a large environmental 
organization that promotes forest 
conservation in Brazil. If you choose 
this option we will donate 78BRL on 
your behalf to the organization of your 
choice for a forest conservation project 
in Brazil. We will send you a 
confirmation of the respective 
organization. 
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Table A.3 shows summary statistics for the items used to construct the dependent 
variable for climate risk perceptions. We asked participants whether they think 
climate change will harm them personally, and whether climate change will harm 
Brazil in general. The means and standard deviations of the two variables are very 
close. This means that study participants’ views on the personal and general harm of 
climate change are very similar.  
 
Table A.3: Summary Statistics for Climate Risk Perception 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Personal harm 2449 4.52 0.65 1 5 
General harm 2449 4.55 0.63 1 5 
Composite variable 
for risk perception 
2449 9.07 1.02 2 10 
 
 
The composite measure for the dependent variable capturing preferences concerning 
policy for climate change mitigation was constructed using polychoric correlation 
matrix analysis. The results are shown in Table A.4. The factor loading range is 
between 0.25 and 0.68. 
 
Table A.4: Results of Polychoric Correlation Matrix Analysis for Climate Change 
Mitigation Support 
 Survey Items  Support  
1. Less land for agriculture or construction in Brazil. 0.37 
2. The government of Brazil has to reduce government spending/investment 
in other areas. 
0.25 
3. The government of Brazil has pledged to reduce the country's emissions of 
carbon dioxide (CO2), which contribute to climate change. 
0.46 
4. Brazil should increase its forest conservation efforts on its own. 0.67 
5. Brazil should reduce its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions on its own. 0.68 
N 2449 
Eigenvalue 1.33 
Notes: Survey item wordings are shown in the main part of the paper. Only a single factor 
resulted in an eigenvalue greater than 1 in all five latent constructs. The eigenvalue for the 
significant factor is reported in the last row. 
 
Table A.5 presents summary statistics for all survey items used for constructing the 
dependent variable on climate change mitigation support, as well as the composite 
measure. 
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The dependent variable for willingness to pay for climate change mitigation was 
constructed based on polychoric correlation matrix analysis. The results are shown in 
Table A.6. The factor loading range is between 0.38 and 0.80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5: Summary Statistics for Support for Climate Change Mitigation 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Less land for 
agriculture  
2449 3.03 0.77 1 4 
Reduce 
government 
spending 
2449 2.93 0.80 1 4 
Reduce country's CO2 2449 3.39 0.66 1 4 
Increase 
forest 
conservation 
2449 2.80 0.50 1 3 
Reduce CO2 on its own 2449 4.60 0.92 1 5 
Support 2449 0.82 0.16 0 1 
 
 
Table A.6: Results of Polychoric Correlation Matrix Analysis for Willingness to Pay 
Survey Item Willingness to pay 
1.  Raise taxes to fund forest 
conservation 
0.61 
 
2. Pay additional R$30 in taxes for 
climate policies 
 
0.80 
 
3. Pay R$100 to ENGO  
 
0.67 
4. Pay more for forest products 
 
0.71 
 
5. Lottery 
 
0.38 
N 2449 
Eigenvalue 2.12 
Notes: only a single factor resulted in an eigenvalue greater than 1 in all five latent constructs. The 
eigenvalue for the significant factor is reported in the last row. 
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Table A.7 presents summary statistics for all survey items used to construct the 
composite willingness to pay measure, and for the composite measure. 
 
Table A.7: Summary Statistics for Willingness to Pay for Climate Change Mitigation 
Variable          Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Raise taxes 2449 2.28 0.88 1 4 
Pay R$ 30 in taxes 2449 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Contribute R$ 100 to an 
ENGO 
2449 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Pay more for forest 
products 
2449 0.68 0.46 0 1 
Lottery 2449 0.44 0.50 0 1 
WTP 2449 0.43 0.29 0 1 
 
 
Table A. 8: Survey items for economic conditions (translation from Portuguese) 
1. How do you expect the national 
economic situation in Brazil as a whole 
to develop over the next three years? It 
will... 
 
Become a lot worse 
Become somewhat worse 
Stay the same 
Become somewhat better 
Become a lot better 
 
2. Do you think your household income 
in the next three years will... 
 
Decrease a lot  
Decrease somewhat 
Stay the same 
Increase somewhat 
Increase a lot 
 
3. Thinking back over the last year, what 
was your household's annual income? 
Range: Less than R$40,000... More than 
R$150,000 
 
 
Table A.9 shows the survey items employed in the analysis as control variables. We 
add to our models a wide range of potential determinants that have been identified as 
relevant in prior public opinion about climate change research (e.g., Geels 2013; 
Wiseman et al. 2013; Drews and Bergh 2015). We include two demographic variables, 
gender and age. Gender is a dummy variable, 1 for male and 2 for female. Age is a 
count variable ranging from 18 to 78 years old. We also consider education, and 
political ideology. Education captures the highest level of education of a participant. 
The categories are: no schooling, elementary school, high school, professional 
training, undergraduate studies, and postgraduate studies. The original item for 
political ideology was a categorical variable; left, center left, center, center right, right, 
and uncertain. We recoded this variable to dummy variables (left, center, right and 
uncertain) and use “uncertain” as the baseline category. Participants are likely to 
differ in their knowledge of environmental issues. To capture knowledge, we asked 
participants a question on greenhouse emissions. Also, we include an item that 
measures whether participants consider deforestation a crucial environmental issue in 
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Brazil (deforestation salience). Additional to the economic indicators we also asked 
participants whether they are employed (and what is their occupation) or unemployed. 
Hence, we included a binary variable on unemployment (1 otherwise) at the 
individual level. Furthermore, we included a variable that measures trust in the 
Brazilian government (trust). Fairbrother (2016) finds that political trust is an 
important factor that correlates with greater WTP, but not with environmental concern. 
Finally, due to the demographic differences across Brazil we included regional 
dummy variables (Refer to Table A.2 in the appendix for item wordings for the 
control variables). 
 
Table A.9: Survey Items Used for Control Variables (translation from Portuguese) 
 
1. What is your gender? 
 
 
2. In what year were you born? 
 
 
 3. What is the highest education level you have completed? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Thinking about politics these days, how would you describe your own 
political viewpoint? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Could you tell us which of the following statements you consider correct? 
The "greenhouse effect", as debated in international negotiations on climate 
change, refers to: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. In your view is deforestation in Brazil, a... 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. I trust the federal government to do what is right 
 
 
 
1 Male  
2 Female 
 
 
Select year 
 
 
1 No schooling 
2 Elementary school 
3 High school 
4 Professional training 
5 Undergraduate studies 
6 Professional diploma 
(5 or 6 years of studies) 
7 Postgraduate studies 
 
1 Left 
2 Center-left 
3 Center 
4 Center right 
5 Right 
6 Not sure 
 
1 Gases in the 
atmosphere that trap 
heat 
2 The Earth's protective 
ozone layer 
3 Pollution that causes 
acid rain 
4 How plants grow 
5 Don’t know 
 
1 Very serious problem 
2 Somewhat serious 
problem 
3 Not too serious 
problem 
4 Not a problem 
 
1 Definitely true 
2 Somewhat true 
3 Somewhat false 
4 Definitely false 
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9. What is your current occupation? 1 Unemployed 
2 Student 
3 Household 
4 Government/ Public 
sector 
5 Farming/fisheries 
6 Manufacturing/ 
industry 
7 Services 
 
 
 
We also provide an examination of the Gauss-Markov assumptions.  
 
Table A.10: Gauss-Markov assumptions 
 
 
Gauss-Markov assumptions 
Dependent variables 
 
(i.e., Risk Perception, support for 
climate policy, WTP for 
deforestation policy) 
Linearity Linearity in  
parameters 
Outliers No significant outliers detected 
Normality  
of residuals 
No issues detected 
Homoskedasticity Heteroskedasticity- employed robust 
standard errors, results unchanged. 
Multicollinearity Variation inflation factor<5 
 
Table A.11 shows results for the relationship between climate risk perceptions and 
economic conditions. Alternative 1 is an ordered logit model using the risk 
perceptions composite measure as the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively 
the same as in the OLS model shown in the main part of the paper. Due to the scaling 
of the dependent variable we obtain a larger coefficient for economic household 
prospects. That is, for a unit increase in individuals’ household income prospects, 
climate risk perceptions decrease by 0.14 units. Alternatives 2 and 3 show the results 
of ordered logit regressions using the disaggregated survey questions as dependent 
variables. Economic household prospects have a negative and significant effect on 
perceived personal and general harm from climate change. 
 
We also examined the impact of economic conditions on the individual items used to 
construct the composite measure of support for climate change and deforestation 
mitigation (Table A.12). Current income turns out to be a significant negative 
predictor (Alternative 2). Individuals who hold more positive views on future national 
economic conditions hold weaker preferences concerning forest conservation. Better 
household prospects and higher current income, however, make people more 
favourable towards reducing Brazil’s CO2. Finally, individuals who believe that the 
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national economy will improve think that Brazil should reduce its CO2 emissions 
regardless of what other countries do. 
 
 
 
Table A.11: Disaggregated Results for Climate Change Risk Perceptions 
 (Alternative 1) (Alternative 2) (Alternative 3) 
 Risk perceptions Personal harm General harm 
Household prospects -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.08** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
National prospects -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Current income  0.01 -0.01 0.05*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Left 0.41*** 0.33*** 0.37*** 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Center -0.09 -0.05 -0.13 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Right 0.11 -0.01 0.23 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) 
Age 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender 0.05 0.15* -0.03 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) 
Education 0.12*** 0.09** 0.10** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Salience of deforest. 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.49*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Unemployment 0.09 0.09 0.01 
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Trust 0.04 0.23*** -0.13* 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Knowledge 0.01 -0.16* 0.22** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
North -0.02 0.09 -0.02 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) 
North East -0.05 0.09 -0.12 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.17) 
South 0.01 0.10 -0.08 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) 
South East -0.03 0.08 -0.10 
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
N 2449 2449 2449 
pseudo R2 0.025 0.032 0.025 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Due to ordinal 
dependent variables, the Alternatives are ordered logit models. The baseline category for the 
left, center, and right variables is the “uncertain”. 
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Table A.12: Disaggregated Results for Support for Climate Change and Deforestation 
Mitigation 
 (Alternative 1) (Alternative 2) (Alternative 3) (Alternative 4) (Alternative 5) 
 
Less land for 
agriculture 
Reduce 
government 
spending 
Reduce the 
country’s 
CO2 
Increase 
forest 
conservation 
Reduce CO2 
on its own 
Household 
prospects -0.02 0.05 0.17*** 0.07 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
National 
prospects -0.04 -0.12*** -0.07* -0.03 0.09* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Current 
income 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
      
Left 0.24** 0.27** 0.26** 0.06 -0.10 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) 
Center 0.07 -0.00 0.07 -0.24* -0.51*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) 
Right -0.01 -0.16 0.05 -0.21 -0.29 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.19) 
Age -0.01 0.01 0.01*** 0.01 0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Gender -0.39*** 0.04 -0.32*** 0.13 0.06 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) 
Education 0.06 0.00 0.11*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Salience of 
deforest. 0.48*** 0.40*** 0.61*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Unemployment -0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.22* 0.30** 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) 
Trust 0.02 0.25*** 0.01 -0.31*** -0.32*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) 
Knowledge 0.13* -0.06 0.47*** 0.22* 0.31*** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) 
North -0.12 -0.20 -0.04 0.53** 0.39** 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22) (0.20) 
North East -0.13 0.03 0.12 0.17 0.41** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.21) (0.19) 
South 0.13 -0.26* 0.33** 0.25 0.59*** 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.22) (0.20) 
South East 0.03 -0.20 0.29** 0.43** 0.57*** 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.19) (0.17) 
N 2449 2449 2449 2449 2449 
pseudo R2 0.016 0.013 0.045 0.033 0.039 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 All Alternatives 
are ordered logit. The baseline category for the left, center, and right variables is the 
“uncertain”. 
 
Additionally, we examined the impact of economic conditions on the individual items 
used to construct the willingness to pay measure (Table A.13). Alternative 1 is an 
ordered logit model due to the scaling of the dependent variable. Regarding the 
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willingness to pay additional taxes to fund forest conservation, we find that 
individuals with a more positive view of their anticipated household income are more 
willing to pay (Alternative 1). When asked whether she/he was willing to pay an 
additional R$ 30 in taxes per month for forest conservation (Alternative 2), none of 
the economic factors had an effect. In Alternative 3, which like Alternative 2 is a logit 
model, we examine contributions of R$100 to an ENGO. We find that people who 
believe that the national economy will get better in the next years are more likely to 
contribute to an environmental NGO. We also asked study participants whether they 
would be willing to pay higher prices for products related to forests. 68% of the 
participants answered positively. We find that people who believe in the improvement 
of their own as well as the country’s economic situation are more willing to pay more 
for forest related products. The logit model results in Alternative 5 show that 
wealthier participants are more likely to donate to an ENGO. Additionally, 
participants who believe that the national economy will improve in the near future 
also are more likely to donate money to an ENGO. This finding is rather encouraging. 
Although study participants do not show high levels of trust in the Brazilian 
government during recession, they are nonetheless willing to donate money to an 
environmental NGO. 
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Table A.13: Disaggregated Results for Willingness to Pay 
 
 (Alternative 1) (Alternative 2) (Alternative 3) (Alternative 4) (Alternative 5) 
 Raise taxes 
 
Pay R$30 in 
taxes 
 
Contribute 
R$100 to an 
ENGO 
Pay more for 
forest related 
products 
Lottery 
Household 
prospects 0.08** 0.03 0.05 0.12*** -0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
National 
prospects 0.01 0.03 0.07* 0.07* 0.13*** 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Current income -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Left 0.32*** 0.21 0.18 0.35** -0.19 
 (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
Center 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.06 0.24** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
Right -0.24* -0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.06 
 (0.14) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) 
Age -0.00 -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.01** 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender 0.25*** 0.05 -0.03 0.32*** 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Education -0.02 0.07* 0.06 0.06 0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Salience of 
deforest. 0.18** 0.30*** 0.13 0.33*** 0.39*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Unemployment -0.06 -0.09 -0.18 -0.04 0.12 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Trust 0.55*** 0.42*** 0.19*** 0.19*** -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Knowledge 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.29*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
North -0.10 -0.12 -0.01 0.04 -0.17 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
North East 0.16 0.05 0.24 0.20 -0.10 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) 
South -0.14 -0.17 -0.34* -0.14 -0.09 
 (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) 
South East -0.02 -0.12 -0.20 -0.02 -0.15 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) 
Constant  -1.42*** -0.77* -0.58 -2.52*** 
  (0.43) (0.45) (0.43) (0.43) 
N 2449 2449 2449 2449 2449 
pseudo R2 0.025 0.027 0.030 0.028 0.027 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Alternative 1 is an 
ordered logit model. The other alternatives are logit models. The baseline category for the left, 
center, and right variables is the “uncertain”. 
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